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China’s current importance on the world political and economic stage is hardly an
anomaly in the history of the world. Five thousand years of dynastic history, science, literature,
engineering, and military might speak to China’s national pride, their record of
accomplishments, and their promise for projecting strength and leadership. In the twenty-first
century, China has rediscovered its historical strength, breaking off colonial chains, and
extending its influence abroad in ways not seen since the voyages of Zheng He during the Ming
Dynasty. In East Asia, China is the clear regional hegemon. Two schools of international
political thought — realism and liberalism — assess its implications and what it means for
economic and military power balances differently. The United States, therefore, is at a crossroads
in this strategic part of the world and has a difficult decision to make. It must either accept realist
thinking and approach China skeptically as a constant potential adversary, or it must adopt a
liberal approach and take China to be a major economic partner with potential for
democratization. Although China does not necessarily present an explicit military challenge to
the United States, it has and will continue to contest America’s economic and political influence,
to the detriment of America’s interests and presence in East Asia. Therefore, it is imperative to
assume a realist worldview by observing with caution and skepticism when dealing with China.
The United States must preempt their geopolitical moves accordingly to ensure they do not assert
undue action against their neighbors in a way that would violate international norms or the
sovereignty of our regional allies.
To start, it is essential that any conversation on the rise of China and its implications for
American foreign policy begin with the differences between the realist and the liberal schools of
international thought, as well as how they respectively interpret political developments and their
causal mechanisms. The realist worldview adheres to the notion that power is king. Realists
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believe that international politics happens within the scope of an anarchic world order and
therefore operates according to a self-help system, meaning that power-balancing is a common
feature among states.1 Since each state is the best and only guardian of its own core interests, it
must approach other partners with the understanding that it cannot truly depend on them for
security or other mutual benefits. Self-interest governs most state interactions, and to ensure their
own maximum outcomes, states need to gain a relative military and economic power advantage
over their neighbors. According to Christopher Layne, there is a version of realism known as
offensive realism, which dictates that states gain security by eliminating their rivals, and, to an
extent, by becoming a hegemon in their own right.2 This power-focused dynamic has indeed
played out on more than one occasion throughout history, mainly through war. Both World Wars
are perfect examples of this. Entangling alliance networks developed in both cases in an attempt
to geo-strategically outmaneuver the opposing state-alliance network, whether it be the Triple
Alliance and Entente of the first World War, or the Axis and Allies of the second World War.
Indeed, as it affects America, Christopher Layne makes indirect reference to the Monroe
Doctrine as America’s attempt to establish its own hemispherical hegemony, meaning that it
would take any European military entrance into its “backyard” as a challenge against its own
territorial legitimacy. He responds to John Mearsheimer’s hypothetical scenario of a Post-War
victorious Germany making an alliance with Mexico by criticizing the notion that it would ever
happen, since America, acting in accordance with a realist perspective, would launch a
preventive war.3
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In the contemporary context, realism dictates circumstances with China and its
geopolitical situation. Walter Russell Mead makes reference to what he calls the “Axis of
Weevils”: China, Russia, and Iran.4 Although at the U.N. these countries appear to form a
cohesive anti-American unit, that is exactly as far as their cohesion goes. As guided by realism’s
explanation of self-interest, China does not see eye to eye with Russia and Iran on relations
between them. China wants low oil prices as a net importer, while Iran and Russia want to sell
high. China also prefers political stability in the Middle East while Russia and Iran want to use it
to their advantage.5 As will be discussed later on, China’s attempt to disrupt the status quo in
East Asia is tightening links between the U.S. and its Asian allies. It is also increasing
nationalism in Japan,6 both of which are realist survival mechanisms and instincts.
In stark contrast, the liberal school of international relations theory offers a less cynical,
more optimistic view of interactions among states. In the liberal internationalist view, there are
two key beliefs. The first is Democratic Peace Theory (DPT), which suggests that democratic
states do not go to war against one another, which is a key reason for the promotion of
democracy around the world as a means of improving America’s security situation.7 The second
belief is that trade facilitates positive relationships and interdependence between the economies
of the involved states, making it less likely that they will go to war. In some cases, the trade
aspect can be absorbed into general political/economic partnerships that proceed from
democratic cooperation. Therefore, it would be considered as a subset of the first belief on DPT.
Indeed, John Ikenberry posits as much when he champions the notion of the Liberal order’s
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enduring power. He references the United States’ “sustained efforts to build a far-flung system of
multilateral institutions, alliances, trade agreements, and political partnerships” and how these
bonding partnerships have “strengthen[ed] global norms and rules that undercut the legitimacy of
nineteenth-century-style spheres of influence.”8 At the helm of global dominance, the United
States has constructed an international order by way of either establishing or promoting such
international organizations as NATO, the United Nations, and the World Trade Organization.
that have integrated new democracies, new states, and rising powers into a peaceful framework
that has seen fewer conflicts since its implementation. Through the liberal democratic lens,
interdependence creates a security apparatus in its own right not through force but through
incentives. In this circumstance, China is most welcome and encouraged to participate as a way
of giving them proverbial “skin” at stake in the international realm of democratic and trade
prosperity, even if China itself is just only starting to experiment with open/non-partisan
elections at the municipal level. Regardless, China is arguably constructing a mirroring
international order with its membership in BRICS, its belt-and-road initiative, leadership of the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and investment in Africa as a means to build its
own illiberal order. As for military affairs, China’s aggressiveness against its neighbors over
maritime rights and nearby islands does not make it a serious contender against the surrounding
democratic security apparatus led by the U.S., so Ikenberry considers them simple “spoilers” at
best to the notion of the prevailing liberal order9.
With both realist and liberal schools of thought accounted for, China’s foreign policy
record and current trajectory reveals two competing narratives. Two Chinas exist between

Gilford John Ikenberry, “The Illusion of Geopolitics: The Enduring Power of the Liberal Order,” Foreign Affairs
91.4 (2014): n.p.
9
Ibid.
8

4
realists and liberals: one that is and has always been in peaceful coexistence with its neighbors
(the liberal version), and another that is and always has been an aspiring great power, patiently
awaiting its moment to claim the central seat of world influence (the realist version). The prior
China wishes to preserve its own sovereignty and to respect that of its neighbors as it has always
claimed to do. The latter China wishes to bring true life and physical meaning to its historical
and metaphysical notion of itself as “Middle Kingdom”.
Starting with the realist assessment of Chinese foreign policy, one can observe that China
has always acted the part of a power player seeking to assert regional hegemony at the cost of its
neighbors, with times of internal turmoil and economic weakness only serving to delay its typical
posture. This is determined from its stance on boundaries and self-perceived notion of centrality
in the universe. As Henry Kissinger describes in his book On China, China has for millennia
labeled itself “zhongguo – the ‘Middle Kingdom’ or the ‘Central Country’,” with its emperor
“conceived of and recognized by most neighboring states as the pinnacle of a universal political
hierarchy, with all other states’ rulers theoretically serving as vassals.”10 This reflects cultural
pride in China’s own history, language, culture, and other nationally defining societal
characteristics, but it has also driven a vain sense of self-importance that has caused it to look
down upon other states. The more a certain people attained Chinese culture and rituals, which
connotes submission to China, the more humanely and compassionately China would treat
them.11 Barbarians, defined by the Chinese as people not in any way sharing a semblance to Sino
customs and tradition, would be treated with hostility. In channeling raw security instincts as
realism would predict, China dealt with its power imbalances against arriving European powers
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by creatively playing them against each other, or as the Chinese put it: to “use barbarians against
barbarians.”12 Prior to the eighteenth century, this involved bribing “barbarians” to fight each
other or submitting to their invaders and Sinicizing them after the fact. By the nineteenth
century, although much less successful, it involved offering lucrative trade offers to the Russians,
French, British, and other European powers, leaving them to compete among themselves for the
preferred relationship. China inevitably had to settle for humiliating terms and treaties legally
signing away concessions in the form of unfavorable trade deals and territory, and China never
adhered to or honored western legalistic norms. Even as power politics and warfare have
impacted the size of China’s realm of influence and its formal boundaries, China still adhered to
its preferred interpretation of boundaries that served its own self-interest above that of its lesser
neighbors. Mao Zedong, leading a revolutionary Communist Party that was eliminating all
notions of its feudal past, still conveniently invoked ancient imperial Chinese principles and
traditions when doing so suited his political purposes. Such was the case when India and China
faced a border dispute over the Himalayan frontier, with India claiming the legalistic McMahon
Line demarcated by the British during their rule, and the Chinese claiming the limits of imperial
China of dynasties past.13 It finished the war victoriously over India, and enforced a peace with
them that they claim was similar to the peace enforced by the Tang Dynasty 1,300 years prior.
History aside, present-day China still exhibits realist tendencies in its economic and
military posturing, indicating cause for concern over the stability of East Asia. Since the fall of
the Soviet Union in the 1990s, Chinese military strategy has shifted from continental defense to a
focus on protecting air and maritime approaches to itself from the east in order to increase the
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costs of American intervention should a local war break out in China’s oceanic or terrestrial
neighborhood.14 China’s counter strategy involves holding U.S. assets at risk within the first
island chain in the East and South China seas, holding the U.S. surface navy at risk within the
second island chain extending to the Marianas, and challenging the U.S. for space and
cyberspace superiority.15 To achieve these ambitions, China has modernized and amplified the
size of its strategic missile, air, and naval forces to catch up with the U.S. military presence,
something a non-aspiring regional power would likely not attempt. China adopted a posture of
threatening American forward bases. The PLA 2nd Artillery Corps added more than 1,100 shortrange ballistic missiles to its arsenal, with ranges stretching between Taiwan and Okinawa, in
addition to 500 Land Attack Cruise missiles with a range to reach beyond Japan (~1000 nautical
miles).16 According to Evan Montgomery, this new equipment and the fourth-generation air
force are part of a “joint anti-air raid campaign” that is designed to send a salvo of missiles
backed by air strikes against U.S. airbases for reassurance that the U.S. air force would be
disabled.17 Meanwhile, the PLA Navy is acquiring thousands of Area Surface Cruise and
Ballistic Missiles to threaten American aircraft carriers and obtaining enhanced-range
submarines and radar detection equipment. Not only that, but China is also developing counterC4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance) mechanisms, namely antisatellite missiles, radio frequency jammers, and
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viruses, that have the ability to disable all electronic equipment, hardware, aircraft, and vessels
belonging to the U.S. and its allies.18
Economically, China may seem amenable and open to scheming with fellow autocracies
like Russia, since both seemingly form a duo in countering U.S. interests. Yet China has again
attempted to outmaneuver so-called allies in an attempt to preserve dominance over its
neighbors. One of the primary concerns is Central Asia. Once a part of the Soviet Union and
Russian Empires, Central Asian states have found themselves to be very appealing partners
caught in a tug-of-war for economic influence between Russia and China as China has
aggressively inserted itself into Russia’s former territory. China has already entered a strategic
partnership with Uzbekistan as of 2012, and Vladimir Putin has sought to counter China’s
economic surge with the creation of the “Eurasian Union,” which is a military, political, and
economic union akin to the European Union complete with an Economic Commission and a
Customs Union.19 This has pulled Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan closer to Russia, but China still
cuts into those relationships too. As of 2009, China had built pipelines connecting directly to
Kazakh oil fields and Turkmen gas fields, bypassing Russia completely, thereby undercutting
Russian energy profit potential in the region.20 China is evidently not one to accept resource
dependency from other states. As China has done with its military, it is posturing itself
economically to overcome its Russian neighbor.
The liberal interpretation of Chinese foreign policy would counter with a stark contrast to
the aforementioned Machiavellian scheming suggested by realist judgments of China’s actions.
The liberal understanding that market reforms enable liberal democratization and subsequently
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reduce conflict among states, can apply to China, even if it is a single party state, by participating
in the international arena as a partner rather than an antagonist. Historically, China has been a
singular kingdom in both its demographic identity and hegemony. Geography separated China
from other major civilizations: The Himalayas separated it from India, the Central Asian deserts
separated it from Persia, and the vast expanses of Siberia to the north and oceanic expanses to the
south and east precluded any European contact until the seventeenth century. China has never
been and still is not democratic, but nonetheless it still exercises indirect contact with distant
lands along the Silk Road via trade caravans.21 It also never expressed a desire to claim or
conquer new territories, an attitude completely opposite to European counterparts and their
imperial ambitions. In fact, as Henry Kissinger notes:
“The territorial claims of the Chinese Empire stopped at the water’s edge. As early as the
Song Dynasty (960-1279), China led the world in nautical technology; its fleets could
have carried the empire into an era of conquest and exploration. Yet China acquired no
overseas colonies and showed relatively little interest in the countries beyond its coast. It
developed no rationale for venturing abroad to convert the barbarians to Confucian
principles or Buddhist virtues.”22
Even in its imperial history, China never had aggressive territorial aims in lands it did not
consider to be part of its core, defying realist expectations in classical and medieval eras and
matching more closely the behavior of modern democratic states. The fact of this imperial outlier
gives liberals reason to believe that China and its historical heritage do not fit the western
psychological mold of international relations that would suggest it to be a Machiavellian member
of the international community. In fact, with the exception of the communist ideological fervor
pushed by Mao Zedong during his tenure as chairman, China has displayed a calm posture in
foreign affairs.
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Whereas western states acting in the realist perspective might consider a build-up of arms
and military modernization as an attempt at regional hegemony, China would consider it as a
precautionary measure to ensure its own sovereignty against another invasive violation. Mao
Zedong broke with Chinese history by engaging in what Thomas Christensen calls
“revolutionary evangelism” in the 1950s and 1960s, fomenting armed revolts in neighboring
states to spread revolutionary communism, notably in Korea, while shaming the Soviet Union for
being too “moderate” in in its communist commitments.23 It could be interpreted as a
reinforcement of neighboring regimes that had already chosen a communist path and were
struggling to preserve it. Even so, at its worst, China under Mao opened to the United States
through dialogue. In their first Joint Communique in 1972, China expressed its opposition to
hegemony, its opposition to colonial imperialism, and support for national self-determination
across the world.24 In fact, listed under the segment on mutual interests is a commitment by both
the U.S. and China to avoid dividing the world into spheres of influence and to refrain from
establishing hegemony in the Asia-Pacific.25 Deng Xiaoping, speaking on behalf of Mao Zedong
at the United Nations in 1974, repeated these sentiments in his speech at the 6th Special Session
of the General Assembly when he said that should China ever become a superpower, it inevitably
would also be a tyrant, seeing one and both as the same.26 The speech ironically carried an
incendiary tone, condemning the exploitative nature of market capitalism as well as capitalism’s
imperialistic aspects so as to champion the cause of the third world.
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Yet, with Mao’s death, a new China would emerge. Deng Xiaoping, the Communist
Party successor to Mao, pulled China from its aggressive revolutionary path and instead placed it
on its current steady path of diplomatic integration. Almost immediately, Deng directed Chinese
foreign policy on a path to openness, dialogue, and cooperation with the international
community. The first major step was the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S. in
December of 1978 (to take effect January 1, 1979), made possible by the reaffirmation of the
Shanghai Communique against establishing hegemony and U.S. recognition of one China.27
Despite the Chinese insistence on Taiwan’s importance to Chinese sovereignty, Deng allowed
for “cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations” between the U.S. and Taiwan,
understanding that normalization in Sino-American relations would “contribute to the cause of
peace in Asia and the world.”28 With diplomatic dialogue and trade to proceed, a repeat of
Korean War style conflict became nearly impossible, and even if China was not becoming a
democracy, liberal school academics could at least point to improvements in China’s shift from
domestic demands of totalitarian party purism under Mao.
The political improvements, however significant, were dwarfed by economic
liberalization reforms that, to this day, have delivered astounding results in national
development. The economic half of the liberalist premise explains much more about Chinese
foreign policy behavior than the democratic half and even offers cues on how China’s integration
ought to proceed going forward. History already displays China as a center of regional
commerce, envied by its neighbors and European merchants thousands of miles away. In fact,
until the Industrial Revolution, China was the world’s largest and most productive economy.
With the largest trading area and complete self-sufficiency, China had a greater share of world
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GDP than any Western country for eighteen of the last twenty centuries.29 Kissinger adds that “as
late as 1820, it produced over 30 percent of world GDP – an amount exceeding the GDP of
Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and the United States combined.”30
China fell from economic grace throughout the nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries as
European powers extracted large trade and territorial concessions from China and later as Mao
Zedong’s socialist policies tanked national productivity (and send tens of millions into poverty
and death). Liberalists would not have much cause to celebrate if the Great Leap Forward and
Cultural Revolution were still formal policy. However, as referenced earlier, Deng Xiaoping’s
rise to power altered China’s trajectory for the better. Since the late 1970s, Deng restored market
incentives to the economy, restored land ownership rights to farmers, opened the country to
foreign trade and investment, and established a merit-based system of bureaucratic promotion to
replace the ideological loyalty system of patronage.31 The results have been unprecedented, with
300 million people lifted above the international poverty standard, 10 percent per year real
economic growth, a GDP that has doubled every seven years since 1979, an increase of per
capita income from $220 in 1978 to $4,940 in 2011, and attaining second largest economy status
behind the United States.32 As liberalists would predict, the increase in Chinese market
participation led to a greater participation in international institutional mechanisms and a lesser
dependence on aggression as a means of statecraft. In fact, contrary to realists’ focus on selfinterest and power balance, liberalists would argue that China is looking for a stable international
system as part of its foreign policy goals. China does not seek to eliminate or undermine
international institutions or rules because it has no viable alternative to offer and is therefore a
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member of every major international institution (G7, G20, U.N. Peacekeeping, etc.). However,
China does seek to “democratize” these international structures to serve the needs of those
outside the west who would wish for their own chance at an economic miracle, mainly by getting
non-G7 industrialized democracies involved in leading such structures and global endeavors.33
One could interpret China’s construction of parallel institutions such as the Asia Infrastructure
Investment Bank (AIIB) as complementary to the existing western-led framework of global
institutions. Though China may seek to resist Western dominance of international finance and
commerce, its creation of non-replacement, coexisting programs shows that it is not in the
business of overturning the existing global economic system.34 China also has much to gain from
the existing international order, and open markets are responsible for the decline in militant
ideological fervor in China in the decades since Mao’s passing. China’s abidance by the
international set-up of rules has enabled its extraordinary rise to economic success and global
respect, facilitated by its economic interdependence with the U.S. and the United States’
provision of once inaccessible, but now public, goods to the Chinese economy.35 Trade and
diplomacy of these kinds, a liberalist would argue, has and will continue to make a peaceful
partner out of China. Nevertheless, military power remains the primary obsession of analysts,
power being, according to realist political theory, the final and ultimate decider of who dictates
the circumstances in any given corner of the world.
Concerning the rise of China over the last century, there are political optimists and
pessimists who, as with realists and liberalists, see two different Chinas going forward, each with
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an opposite trajectory. Christopher Layne considers the optimistic and pessimistic views as two
extreme and opposite analytical traps. If analyzed together though, one can identify a version of
China that fits both molds. Optimists and pessimists only take account of raw material power,
and nothing else that might bear importance such as history, culture, and domestic politics.
According to Layne, pessimists consider China’s rise to regional hegemony as a destabilizing
factor in East Asia and are often fearful of China’s national power with the understanding that
U.S. leadership in Asia is not adequately sustainable.36 Optimists, on the other hand, claim that
China will not catch up to U.S. military capabilities in the near future, with all measures of
military power and economic indicators demonstrating that the U.S. has insurmountable
superiority (for now at least) over China such that the U.S. need not concern itself over
incremental Chinese improvements.37 As a matter of practical public policy, accounting for the
relative loss of American advantage over China should be balanced with a calm and collected
attitude towards the long-term vision of geopolitical strategy revisal. One must understand that
plenty of time remains before the balance of power notably shifts, while not mistaking that
situation for eternal advantage or even short-term invincibility.
Acknowledging the pessimist analysis of East Asia, there are indeed several reasons to be
concerned with China’s rise. First, whether or not China chooses to extol its own bargaining
position in this world or not, it knows as well as everyone else in the international community
that it has substantial weight to influence events as it likes, whenever it likes (barring U.S.
intervention for the short term). China has the world’s largest population (and therefore the
capacity to summon the world’s largest armed force) and the world’s second largest economy
behind the U.S. It is also one of nine nuclear powers and is physically equivalent in size to the
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U.S. with borders on Central Asia, South Asia, South East Asia, Russia, and East Asia. China
may be building bases on artificial islands in its adjacent seas, but its military resources are all on
its territory and immediate periphery. The U.S., by contrast, has military personnel and
equipment strewn throughout all six permanently inhabited continents. This means that under the
weight of the unipolar world order, with multiple world security distractions on any given day,
the U.S. will be underprepared and understaffed to meet a Chinese threat. In addition, several
indicators would indicate that American geopolitical influence and power advantages have
declined, and will continue to fall until China surpasses the U.S. as it seems poised to do. For
example, at the end of World War II, the U.S. not only accounted for half the world’s GDP, but
was also the primary creditor nation, enjoyed a positive trade balance, and had sole possession of
atomic weapons. The U.S. also designed international institutions (IMF, U.N., GATT) and held a
goodwill spanning the entirety of western and developing countries from its Marshall Plan.38
Today, none of these advantage situations still hold true, with the exception of the international
system the U.S. founded which still has seen a rise in non-U.S. leadership and influence. China is
expected to surpass U.S. economic output by 2025, and regional economic powers have emerged
across the continents like Brazil, India, and Turkey, all of whom have either rejected cooperation
on security matters (like Turkey) or are decreasingly deferential to American leadership (Brazil
and India), which is why the G8 expanded into the G20.39 The United States’ influence and
status in the community of nations is declining. The Iraq and Afghan wars, by all measures and
benchmarks for success, have failed. Dictators like Bashar Al-Assad have not stepped down to
U.S. pressure. Iran is pursuing nuclear enrichment despite western sanctions. Worst of all, the
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U.S. is heading towards bankruptcy and is acting as if a shortage of future resources is of no
object. The Congressional Budget Office released projections stating that, on the present course,
federal debt will exceed 100 percent of GDP by 2023, and 190 percent of GDP by 2035.40 In the
near future, policymakers may realize that they cannot project authority from bankruptcy court,
and the increasing debt-interest payments could force a harsh choice of budget prioritization
between mandatory entitlement spending and discretionary military spending. For these reasons,
the pessimist case has a point. The only question is when exactly the clock will ring on American
dominance of East Asia.
An optimist’s analysis of East Asia will provide comforting indicators that should allow
military analysts and policymakers in D.C. to make well-calculated, long-term considerations
with peace of mind. As it stands right now, the U.S. armed forces are strategically located in
such a way that forms a pincer between China’s East and West. East of China lies the U.S.
Pacific Command (PACOM), equipped with 325,000 military personnel, 180 ships and 1,900
aircraft; to China’s west is U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), equipped with tens of
thousands of troops and several airbases between Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan. All around China
are states participating in bilateral defense treaties with the U.S.–Australia, New Zealand, Japan,
South Korea, and the Philippines.41 This completes a strategic circle around most of China, and
therefore there is not a need to expand on a system that is currently working as is. The deterrent
effect so far has shown that as a result of encirclement, China is not yet in a position to challenge
U.S. strength.
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In addition, for all the commentary suggesting American dependency on China, it may be
more appropriate to suggest that the opposite is indeed the case, and that China will still need the
U.S. for some time to come. To China, the U.S. is its single most important market and its largest
source of foreign direct investment and advanced technology.42 The U.S. Navy can also blockade
China’s sea lanes, thereby blocking critical shipments of oil and metal ore supplies, and the U.S.
Treasury can impose sanctions backed by Federal Reserve on Chinese financial interests, the
latter controlling the interest rates of the world’s reserve currency — the U.S. dollar.43 Lastly,
despite the United States’ One-China policy, there are indeed actually “Two Chinas” in practice:
Mainland China and Taiwan. The country is technically still divided, and that provides the U.S. a
bargaining chip to keep China’s long-term grand ambitions on a leash. In the U.S.-China
Communiqué of 1982, the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to acknowledging “One China”, and
also stated its intention not to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, with a
gradual reduction in sales and transfers until the final resolution of the Taiwan issue.44 Ironically,
the arms sales benchmark for gradual reductions was set at 1979 levels with inflation
adjustments such that arms sales were actually increasing, and the U.S. redefined its arms sales
as “technology transfers” to skirt agreement requirements.45 This rendered the 1982 communiqué
a dead letter, and since then, Taiwan has liberalized towards democracy, making future
unification with China a more complicated affair.
Still, the U.S. retains defense privileges if China forces itself into Taiwan, in which case
the U.S. can resume full and explicit military cooperation with Taiwan. China, of course, is
aware of this disadvantage, and of all the disadvantages holding China back. The seemingly
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hopeless split from a significant piece of land it considers its own is the greatest humiliation to
its own notion of internal sovereignty. If China chooses to challenge the United States, it will be
over what it considers its own undisputed territory, and thus far China is unwilling to challenge
the U.S. for restoration of the “twenty-third province.” The U.S., as demonstrated, has a flexible
range of punitive measures to restrain China from military to economic, and the economic
incentive on its own is compelling enough to cause China to second guess its own actions. The
optimistic case, therefore, is proven and reassuring of the U.S. security situation.
In consideration of this comprehensive analysis of realist and liberal interpretations of
China’s history, military modernization, and economic growth, the best course for engaging
China as the U.S. is to proceed with a realist-optimist state of mind. Policy optimism is the levelheaded and collected approach to China, whereas pessimism sets a stage for cynicism in which
everything would needlessly be put through a hostile lens, precluding opportunities for
meaningful China-U.S. cooperation. Realism should ideologically guide American analyst
interpretations of Chinese activity, understanding that each state ultimately prioritizes its own
position first, and places economic unity and diplomatic cooperation second (or as it sees fit).
To this end, American foreign policy should recalibrate away from immediate military
focus and readiness, to avoid unnecessary short-term conflicts in territories and waters not of
strategic interest to the U.S. Instead of paying the costs of maintaining direct military presence in
East Asia, the U.S. should allow China’s neighbors to band together to collectively defend their
interests while domestic political deficiencies can be fixed. This means adopting a strategy of
offshore balancing, not because America is too weak to project power, but because it has plenty
of time to rebuild its military and diplomatic strength and China is not going to change its
behavior overnight. As antiquated as it sounds, America can and should pursue an offshore
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balancing strategy because of its separation by two oceans, its weak and friendly neighbors, its
abundance of land and resources, and a large and productive population.46 As Stephen Walt and
John Mearsheimer describe it, offshore balancing is a realist grand strategy, and would be
responsible and tempered in allowing regional forces to keep each other in check, although the
United States would come onshore to stabilize situations as a measure of last resort, to leave as
soon as the situation is resolved.47 In addition to that, offshore balancing costs considerably less
money than any strategy besides isolationism, particularly since it requires that America
concentrate forces into only the strategic area in threat, much to the chagrin of the Chinese who
stand to benefit from thin U.S. forces dispersal.48
To successfully rely on an offshore balancing strategy, America needs its allies around
China to serve as the first line of defense. The Chinese strategy of encirclement a la Weiqi would
be the staple of America’s approach to deterring Chinese assertiveness. The U.S. currently
enjoys military arrangements with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, however
encirclement will not be complete until India, Russia, and the Central Asian Republics (most
importantly Kazakhstan) join in subtle collaboration to check Chinese ambitions in unison.
Without making it exclusively militaristic in focus, which would be pure containment, this
collaborative effort should focus more on cumulative balancing through other forms of
cooperation. The approach offered by Ashley Tellis in her writings would prove useful in this
endeavor. In it, she suggests that the U.S. ought to assist these regional powers with reaching
their strategic interests as a means by which to build trust, interdependence, cooperation, and a
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series of deepened partnerships.49 If U.S. aid or assistance can strengthen regional partners,
particularly economically, then these states’ bargaining positions strengthen in such a way that
economic interdependence between them and China would increase, thereby reducing China’s
capacity for malevolence.50 This would require U.S. reentry into the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
and the fostering of Free Trade Agreements, regional and bilateral, between the U.S. and the
encircling states, the U.S. and China, and also between China and the encircling states. In effect
a trade triangle would be needed to implement this strategy. As the next strategy point will cover,
economic growth is everything to China, and to risk the encirclement of sanctions would hurt it
more than territorial disputes are worth. Just as NATO exists in Europe to protect member state
sovereignty against an aggressive Russia, this pan-Asian circle of states should coalesce to form
an unspoken NATO equivalent to protect their own sovereignty against China.
From an economic perspective, it will be critical to stall Chinese ambitions with
continued trade and foreign investment, since economic growth and improved standards of living
are what China have valued most since the death of Mao Zedong. Economic growth in China has
been shrinking since 2010, which is problematic since regime legitimacy rests on rising popular
welfare, global stature, and social stability51. As economic growth diminishes, China’s party
regime apparatus, and Xi Xinping especially, will need to adopt a more aggressive foreign policy
to save face with its elites. However, as the optimist would say, there is time. Declining growth
has encouraged China to improve its economic performance by market liberalization efforts:
interest rate flexibility, forming a bank deposit insurance system, expanding the private sector,
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more research & development spending, and services sector promotion.52 U.S. corporations and
domestic/international financial institutions combined have influence over all these efforts with
their knowledge and expertise in such endeavors. Improved economic conditions ensure a less
belligerent attitude in China, and a China not focused on territorial aggression is a China that will
not need an American balancer.
As history proceeds into the twenty-first century, ongoing economic, political, and
military patterns will continue to shape the global security situation in East Asia in ways for
which no state can perfectly prepare for. When the twentieth century began, few foresaw the rise
of Communism and the consequent birth of the USSR or Maoist China. Few foresaw two world
wars from which the U.S. would emerge as the world’s military hegemon and leader of the
international arrangement of world-integrating institutions. China is no exception to surprising
developments. Should China’s foreign policy change, for better or worse, the U.S. must be ready
to act upon each development. As the world awaits rise of this competitor power, China will
undoubtedly reassert its national pride and resurrect its historical standing. As China’s economy
becomes more central to international trade and China increases its sway over international
institutions, the Middle Kingdom might come back sooner than the ordinary analyst might guess.
China will continue to assert itself in the South and East China Seas and will likely back its
territorial ambitions with military force against its neighbors, so the question remains when it
will do so. The United States must not shirk its moral authority and responsibility to ensure that
all states abide by international laws and norms. The U.S. has time to solidify its relationships
and to employ new military technologies, but must not refrain from exercising its East Asian
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presence too long lest China destabilize a strategic location of the world, and a new Cold War
ensues with a new bipolar order.
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